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This study examines the consumer welfare impact of animal welfare legislation mandating 
cage-free egg production in California. We estimate California egg consumers’ willing-
ness to pay (WTP) for cage-free eggs using household-level purchase data and compare 
the implied premium to higher production costs when calculating the potential change in 
consumer surplus. Our findings suggest that larger households and/or households with 
limited means are most likely to be affected. Furthermore, the implied welfare loss for 
consumers is approximately $106 million. Although consumers value cage-free eggs, 
higher production costs result in a net welfare loss to consumers. One implication of this 
finding is that a clear labeling practice may be a more efficient way to motivate animal 
welfare and non-cage systems. 
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According to the 2007 Census of Agriculture, California is the United States’ largest producer 
of agricultural products and the eighth largest agricultural economy in the world (U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, 2007). California voters and legislators have recently approved a 
series of legislative changes largely aimed at achieving environmental goals. Examples of 
proposed or enacted legislation include an increase in air quality restrictions on diesel 
exhaust, significant water restrictions for much of the growing season, and stricter standards 
for confining farm animals. These initiatives have the potential to adversely affect the state’s 
agricultural economy and may result in a net loss of consumer welfare by raising production 
costs and, consequently, market prices. We seek to quantify the implied welfare effects of one 
specific change in regulations: mandating that egg-laying chickens be raised in a cage-free 
production environment. 
  Proposition 2, which voters approved in 2008, amends the California Health and Safety 
Code as it applies to all California egg, beef, and hog producers. While the changes that are 
due to take effect in 2015 impact all animal sectors, they promise to have the most significant 
implications for shell egg producers. Essentially, the new regulations mandate specific param-
eters that define the minimum cage size needed for chickens to perform particular behaviors; 
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turn around freely for the majority of the day” (National Hog Farmer, 2008).
1 Recognizing 
this would simply lead to higher imports of caged eggs, the California legislature banned the 
sale of animal products not in compliance with Proposition 2 regardless of their source. On 
July 6, 2010, the Governor of California signed AB 1437, which states: “Commencing 
January 1, 2015, a shelled egg may not be sold or contracted for sale for human consumption 
in California if it is the product of an egg-laying hen that was confined on a farm or place that 
is not in compliance with animal care standards set forth in Chapter 13.8 [the standards 
described by Proposition 2]” (California State Senate, 2010). As argued by Sumner, Rosen-
Molina, and Matthews (2008), conventional hen housing does not conform to Chapter 13.8 
standards, so non-cage systems would have to be implemented for all eggs sold in California 
beginning in 2015.
2 
  Other states have passed similar legislation. Most notably, Arizona’s Proposition 204, which 
passed in 2006, maintains that all pork be produced in “stall-free” environments. While our 
analysis specifically addresses California’s Proposition 2, our findings likely generalize to 
other forms of environmental regulation that cause producers to fundamentally change the 
way they operate. 
  Previous studies investigate the economic impact of animal welfare regulation as it relates 
to laying-hen cages. Rahn (2001) argues that restrictive regulations on cage sizes result in 
technical inefficiencies, since growers can no longer use their profit-maximizing choice of 
inputs. He suggests clear and regulated labeling practices may be a better alternative solution. 
In terms of production costs, Sumner, Rosen-Molina, and Matthews (2008) estimate that 
cage-free egg production costs are at minimum 20% higher than conventional egg production 
costs. In addition, they estimate that California shell egg producers will incur a $200–$800 
million cost to retrofit existing housing facilities. However, these studies tend to focus on 
increased producer costs, which may or may not be passed to the consumer through higher 
retail prices. 
  The fact that California voters approved Proposition 2 by 63% of the vote may suggest 
consumers are willing to pay more for products claiming to protect animal welfare.
3 Using a 
hypothetical survey of egg consumers in Great Britain, Bennett (1997) reports consumers on 
average would be willing to pay £0.43 more for cage-free eggs (at the time of the study, the 
average price for a dozen eggs was £1.40). However, experimental evidence suggests people 
overstate their willingness to pay (WTP) when asked hypothetical valuation questions relative 
to nonhypothetical scenarios. Specifically, List and Gallet (2001) find that respondents state 
values 2%–20% greater in hypothetical questions relative to nonhypothetical valuation ques-
tions. In contrast, nonhypothetical experiments have the ability to uncover consumers’ true 
WTP, because participants in the experiment are provided real economic incentives to make 
decisions that provide the most benefit at the lowest possible cost. In the alternative, revealed 
preference data, such as the household-panel data used here, provide a more direct way of 
measuring consumers’ apparent willingness to pay. 
  Using household-level data of a panel of Danish citizens in a mixed logit framework, 
Andersen (2008) concludes that consumers are willing to pay DKK2.81 ($0.556) more for 
a dozen free-range eggs compared to regular shell eggs. However, European consumers may
                                                 
1 For a discussion on poultry behavior and welfare relating to housing, see Appleby, Mench, and Hughes (2004). 
2 Detailed discussions of laying-hen cage systems can be found in Rahn (2001) and Bell and Weaver (2002). 
3 Clearly, many factors other than a willingness to pay for cage-free eggs may also have influenced voting behavior: altruistic 
feelings of empathy for farm animals, a need to make the “politically correct” choice, or even a disregard for or acceptance of the 
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differ from their American counterparts, particularly in matters concerning animal welfare or 
environmental issues. No research to date has investigated the WTP of American consumers 
in general, or California consumers in particular, regarding laying-hen animal welfare attri-
butes. Accordingly, the objective of this research is to determine the WTP for cage-free eggs 
by consumers in California and to identify market segments that are likely to bear a dispro-
portionate impact. 
  We estimate WTP using household-level purchase data in a mixed-logit modeling frame-
work. Our results suggest only 20.63% of all households would be willing to buy cage-free 
eggs at the average 2007–2008 prices. Furthermore, if all egg prices rise to the cage-free 
level, the effect is highly regressive—i.e., households that will be most impacted consist of 
five members or more, and have generally lower levels of income. In total, the implied welfare 
loss, based on a compensating variation measure, is $106 million. Finally, we estimate the 
average WTP for a dozen cage-free eggs is $0.524 above the regular shell-egg price. Taken 
together, the results imply that if all prices rise to cage-free levels, the quantity demanded for 
eggs in general will fall substantially. 
 
Econometric Model of California Eggs 
While eggs are often regarded as commodities, many suppliers differentiate their eggs by 
advertising attributes that ostensibly pertain to better health such as vitamin E or Omega-3 
fatty-acid enriched, or animal welfare attributes such as cage-free, free-range, and vegetarian-
fed hens. This makes eggs a differentiated product, because many of these attributes command a 
price premium in the market. Hence, a discrete choice model is appropriate (Nevo, 2001). 
Furthermore, in order to account for unobserved heterogeneity in consumer preferences, we 
use a random coefficient logit (RCL) model. A random coefficient specification also allows 
us to estimate consumer-specific parameter estimates, which are necessary to calculate WTP 
values that vary by market segment. 
  Formally, we assume that a sample of H households  {1,2,..., } hH  make purchases 
among B brands  {1,2, ..., } bB  on purchase occasion  {1,2, ..., }. tT   With this assumption, 
the conditional indirect utility of household h for alternative b on purchasing occasion t can 
be written as: 
(1)  11 22 , hbt hbt hbt hbt bt hbt Ud d

       x   
where η is a k-dimensional vector of parameters including an intercept term for each brand 
γhb, and xhbt is a vector of brand and household attributes. Brand attributes ( bt hbt  xx ) 
consist of several variables including brand b’s retail price at time t (pbt), and an indicator of 
whether the product is offered on a temporary discount (ddbt). The temporary discount 
variable equals 1 if the brand was discounted more than 10% for a duration of one week and 0 
otherwise. Finally, xbt includes an interaction term between the retail price and the temporary 
discount (ddbt pbt) (Chintagunta, 2002; Richards, 2007).
4 By including an interaction term, we
                                                 
4 Inspection of households’ purchase patterns reveals that almost all of the households regularly purchase the same quantity of 
eggs on each purchase occasion, with the time between purchases often being almost constant. Furthermore, because the code date 
for eggs suggests they expire 30 days after they are packaged by the manufacturer, we conclude households are not stockpiling 
eggs; it appears households replenish their inventory once all of the eggs are either consumed or expired. Nevertheless, the measure 
of inventory following Bucklin and Gupta (1992) was added to a model specification similar to that given in equation (1). 
Consistent with Allender and Richards (2010), the results suggested the model without inventory fit the data better (these results 
are available from the authors upon request). Therefore, the measure of inventory is excluded from the final model specification. Allender and Richards  Animal Welfare Regulation in the California Poultry Industry   427 
 
allow items on promotion to become less elastic if households perceive discounting as a means 
of differentiating otherwise similar products. Additionally, we include a binary cage-free 
variable (cfbt) equal to 1 if the particular product sold had the cage-free attribute and 0 
otherwise, a binary variable equal to 1 if the brand sold contained an organic attribute (orgbt), 
and a binary variable equal to 1 if the eggs sold were white eggs (webt). In order to account 
for any change in cage-free egg preferences due to the Proposition 2 campaign, we include an 
interaction term between the binary cage-free variable and the number of television 
commercials that were shown on any particular day (cfbt adbt) in favor of Proposition 2 (Lusk, 
2010). 
  A household’s prior experiences with a brand can influence the propensity to purchase the 
same brand in the current period. In such cases, there is said to exist structural state 
dependence in the household’s brand choices over time (Honoré and Kyriazidou, 2000). 
To account for structural state dependence, we included lagged dependent variables dhbt−1 
and dhbt−2, which equal 1 if brand b was chosen by household h at time t −
 1 and t –
 2, 
respectively, and 0 otherwise, and ψ1 and ψ2 are adjustment parameters (Erdem, 1996; Roy, 
Chintagunta, and Haldar, 1996; Honoré and Kyriazidou, 2000; Richards, Patterson, and 
Tegene, 2007). By including dhbt−1 and dhbt−2, we account for any brand inertia or variety-
seeking behavior that may carry over from one purchase occasion to the next. 
  Finally, error terms are included to account for all product-specific variation in demand 
that is unobserved by the econometrician, ξbt, and household-specific heterogeneity in 
preferences, bt, which we assume to be i.i.d. type I extreme value distributed and inde-
pendent over time. The assumption of serial independence suggests households have stable 
tastes over the sample time period and cannot forecast prices, firm promotions, etc. in 
optimizing their behavior. Therefore, expectations of future marketing activity do not affect 
current brand choices (Chintagunta, Kyriaziduo, and Perktold, 2001). With this error assump-
tion, the utility specification in (1) implies a discrete choice, logit demand model. 
  It is well understood that a simple logit model suffers from the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives property. Because households are unlikely to obtain the same utility from each 
brand, we specify a random coefficient logit model which introduces a degree of curvature 
that the simple logit lacks. We estimate a model in which the coefficients of the price, binary 
cage-free, and organic variables are lognormally distributed in the population, while the brand 
intercept terms and lagged dependent variables are normally distributed and all other 
parameters are assumed fixed (Train, 1998). A lognormal distribution assures each household 
has a positive coefficient for the variable, which may not be the case if the coefficient is 
assumed to be normally distributed. Specifically, the marginal utility of the cage-free binary 
variable is assumed to be positive because consumers are expected to attach a positive or zero 
value to the animal welfare attribute. Therefore, if someone has no interest in cage-free eggs, 
the estimated coefficient should be zero, whereas any value placed on the cage-free attribute 
would imply ηcf > 0. Similarly, the price coefficient is expected to be negative for all house-
holds. Allowing price to be lognormally distributed and multiplying by −1 ensures this. The 
elements of η that are lognormally distributed are written as: 
(2)  ,~ ( 0 , 1 ) , , . kk h k mv
kh k b t b t b t ev N k p c f o r g
     
The parameters mk and k represent the mean and standard deviation of ln(ηk), which are 
estimated, and vhk is the random term representing the household’s unobserved heterogeneity.428   December 2010  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
 
 
  The coefficients of the brand intercept terms and lagged dependent variables can be nega-
tive or positive factors in influencing household choices depending on their preferences. In 
other words, households differ in their attribute preferences so that an appropriate specifi-
cation for the unobserved heterogeneity is a normal distribution. Specifically, the brand inter-
cept terms γhi in η are denoted by: 
(3)  0 , ~ (0,1) 1,..., 1, hi i i hi i hi hi zv v N i B        
where γ0i represents the mean of the random parameter, zhi is household income, i is the 
brand-specific income effects, vhi is the random term representing the household’s unobserved 
heterogeneity, and i is the standard deviation of γhi. Finally, the lagged dependent variables 
are designated by: 
(4)  0 ,~ ( 0 , 1 ) 1 , 2 , jj j h j h j vv N j       
where the parameters ψ0j and j represent the mean and standard deviation of the lagged 
dependent variables dhbt−j, and vhj is a random term again representing unobserved hetero-
geneity. Because attributes such as the quality of the previously purchased egg, cleanliness, 
and other factors are unobserved, accounting for household heterogeneity present in the 
lagged dependent variables is imperative. Moreover, because these factors can have a positive 
or negative effect on a household’s propensity to purchase in the current period, a normal 
distribution is appropriate. 
  McFadden and Train (2000) interpret the elements of equations (2), (3), and (4) in terms of 
an error-components model of attribute demand. In contrast to the IIA property of a single 
logit model, the heterogeneity assumption in equations (2), (3), and (4) creates a general 
pattern of substitution over B −
 1 alternatives through the unobserved, random part of the 
utility function given in equation (1). Consequently, the utility from different brands is corre-
lated according to their attributes. 
  The RCL model introduces a large number of parameters relative to the simple logit model. 
Therefore, we follow Nevo (2001), among others, and write the indirect utility function in 
terms of two sets of variables—those that are assumed to be random and those that are 
not. For convenience, we set 
T = (k, i, j), m
T = (mk, γ0i, ψ0j), v
T = (vhk, vht, vhj), 
T d = 
(dhbt−1, dhbt−2), and ψ
T = (ψ1, ψ2). By combining equations (1), (2), (3), and (4), the indirect 
utility function is expressed as: 
(5)  (,; ) ( ,, , ; ,, ,, ) , hbt bt bt bt hbt hbt hi hbt j i hbt Uz       xx d v m     
where δbt is the mean utility level that varies over products but not households, and τhbt is the 
idiosyncratic part that varies by household and product. For convenience, let 
ΤΤ
hbt hbt hbt j hbt      xd   
represent the mean utility. The probability that household h chooses brand b at purchasing 
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  The advantages of the RCL model do not come without a cost. Unlike the logit and nested 
logit models, there is no analytical closed form for equation (6). In order to overcome this 
obstacle, we integrate over the densities of the random parameters in the model. We define 
the densities of v as f(v) so that the unconditional probability of household h purchasing 
brand b on purchasing occasion t is obtained by integrating over equation (6) and the distri-


















vv   
which is then estimated using simulated maximum likelihood (SML). 
  Simulated maximum likelihood uses Monte Carlo simulation to solve the integrals in 
equation (7) up to an approximation accurate to the number of random draws chosen, R. This 
method provides consistent parameter estimates under general error assumptions and is 
readily able to accommodate complex structures associated with consumer heterogeneity. 
SML also offers consistent estimates of an endogenous price variable. To aid the speed and 
efficiency of estimation, we employ a Halton draw sequence. Bhat (2003) provides experi-
mental evidence suggesting Halton sequences can reduce the number of draws required to 
produce estimates at a given accuracy by a factor of 10. We found that R =
 100 draws are 
sufficient to produce stable estimates without excessive estimation time. 
  By estimating equation (7), estimates are obtained for each household’s preference 
regarding the cage-free attribute and their marginal utility of income (Train, 2003). These 
parameters are necessary in order to calculate each household’s WTP for cage-free eggs. The 
ln
 (WTP) is distributed normal with the mean calculated as 
 ln exp[ ] [ ] , cf cf ad p WTP Ec f a d m         
and variance calculated as 
22 2 ,
cf p WTP      
where E[·] indicates the expectation operator. Therefore, the mean and standard deviation of 
the WTP for cage-free eggs are calculated, respectively, as: 
(8)      
1/2
22
2 exp and exp exp 1 .
22
WTP WTP
WTP WTP WTP mm
                 
 
We obtain the mean WTP on a household-level basis using this estimate, and from it we can 




Eggs represent a unique opportunity to study the welfare effects of animal welfare regulation 
for a number of reasons. First, given the prominence of Proposition 2 in public discourse in 
2008, animal welfare issues were widely discussed and understood in the context of egg 
production in California. Second, according to the American Egg Board (AEB, 2008), eggs 
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handling costs, eggs generate more weekly profits than any other dairy category in a retail 
supermarket. The AEB estimates that eggs turn over in a supermarket every three and a half 
days, or more than 100 times per year. Furthermore, in the United States, the AEB reports 
there are 235 egg-producing companies with at least 75,000 hens, 63 companies with at least 
1 million laying hens, and 15 companies that own more than 5 million layers. The AEB 
estimates that of the 211.1 million cases of shell eggs produced in 2007, 66 million (31.3%) 
were further processed, 124.6 million (59%) went to retailers in the United States, 19 million 
(9%) went for foodservice use, and 1.5 million (0.7%) were exported as shell eggs. Of this 
total, approximately 5% of eggs sold in California were cage-free in 2007 (Sumner, Rosen-
Molina, and Matthews, 2008). Therefore, eggs are a staple item that many consumers rely on 
for their daily nutrition and, because they are positioned at the center of the animal welfare 
debate in California, are an ideal category for study. 
  The data used in this study consist of household-level, retail egg purchases for 993 
sampled households in California during 2007 and 2008. The data set, A.C. Nielsen, Inc.’s 
“Homescan” database, is collected by requiring participating households to submit all food 
purchase information (price and quantity, along with a product description) each time they 
visit any type of retail food outlet. As such, the data include sales from traditional super-
markets, club stores, superstores, dollar stores, convenience stores, and any other outlet—a 
feature not captured by aggregate, store-level scanner data. In addition to a high degree of 
product detail, the Homescan database also includes a number of socioeconomic and demo-
graphic descriptors. 
  On a product level, the Homescan data contain information on each brand’s price, organic 
attribute presence, color, size, and package size for each brand’s UPC, including private 
labels. However, the data do not include information on whether a particular brand is cage-
free. Therefore, we obtained this information by combining data from Mintel’s Global New 
Products Database (GNPD) with data gathered directly from stores throughout central and 
southern California in August of 2009. The GNPD monitors new product introductions in 
the consumer packaged goods market covering food, beverage, healthcare, household 
personal care, cosmetics, fragrance, and other nonfood sectors. Information on egg product 
attributes was also gathered manually by visiting each grocery store outlet or chain in 
central and southern California and taking pictures of all egg products offered at each out-
let. All relevant attributes and UPC codes were then recorded into a database and attributes 
were matched to the Homescan data via the UPC—which is included for all brands, including 
private label. 
  Inspection of the cage-free attribute database revealed the same brands are often offered as 
either cage-free or regular. For example, under the Eggland’s Best brand name, an almost 
identical product was sold as both cage-free and non-cage-free. Because this practice is 
common across multiple brands, it is not possible to aggregate the cage-free attribute by 
brand. Therefore, we created a binary cage-free variable (cage-free =
 1, non-cage-free = 0) 
based on our recorded observations of each egg UPC. By properly identifying whether a 
brand is cage-free, we can then estimate the preferences for cage-free eggs on an individual 
brand basis. 
  There are a large number of brands available in the egg category—too large to model in a 
tractable way and obtain reliable estimates of household demand. Thus, we selected the 13 
most popular brands and aggregated the others into a single choice, used as the outside 
option. Focusing on the most popular brands in the category allows us to use the maximum 
number of households possible and retain a level of modeling complexity necessary to capture Allender and Richards  Animal Welfare Regulation in the California Poultry Industry   431 
 







Households in   
Our Sample   




Income Bracket:      
  Less than $29,999  17.55  15.67  25.77 
  $30,000 to $39,999  10.80  10.16  11.18 
  $40,000 to $49,999  10.74  10.21  8.06 
  $50,000 to $59,999  10.14  10.40  8.49 
  $60,000 to $99,999  30.38  31.70  22.82 
 $100,000  and  over  20.39  21.86  23.69 
Marital Status:      
 Married  57.57  67.88  51.77 
 Widowed  7.95  7.41  5.22 
 Divorced/Separated  15.43  12.59  9.11 
 Single  19.05  12.12  33.90 
Household Size:      
 1  26.87  17.20  9.02 
 2  38.88  41.45  21.42 
 3  14.80  16.41  18.14 
 4  11.79  15.66  22.52 
 5  4.70  5.27  14.60 
 6  1.96  2.70  7.38 
 7+  1.01  1.31  6.93 
 
the differentiated nature of egg markets. If, throughout the course of the two years, the 
household made more than one brand purchase in a single shopping trip (only 2.89% of 
households), its purchase observations were excluded. Furthermore, Honoré and Kyriazidou 
(2000) demonstrate that six purchase occasions are enough to identify the parameters of 
equation (7). As a result, any household that made fewer than six purchases was excluded 
(33% of households), leaving us with 933 California households within the egg category 
sample. Table 1 gives a comparison of the demographics of the households in the sample 
with those collected in the Current Population Survey (CPS), conducted by the U.S. Census 
Bureau’s Bureau of Labor Statistics. While the demographics of the two groups are not 
exactly the same, they are very close. We therefore believe that the sampled households 
represent the overall population of California reasonably well. To facilitate use of the lagged 
dependent variable, we drop the first two purchase occasions because information on the 
previous purchase is not available. This procedure left us with 16,055 purchase observations, 
which were used to estimate equation (7). 
  The brands used for the analysis are reported in table 2 along with summary statistics, 
including the frequency of purchase throughout 2007 and 2008 and the average price of each 
brand. As observed from the data in table 2, non-cage-free (or regular) private label brands 
were purchased a majority of the time by consumers. During 2007–2008, on average, Egg-
land’s Best has the lowest average price for cage-free eggs and the highest market share. Not 
surprisingly, the table also shows that the brands with the highest average price tend to have 
the highest standard deviation in prices, while those with the lowest average price tend to 432   December 2010  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
 
 




















% White  
Egg  
Sales  
Overall   —  —  2.04  0.77  0.25  95.48 
Overall  Reg. 94.99  1.96  0.70 0.26 97.48 
Overall  CF 5.01  3.48  0.69  0.29  57.57 




































Becky Farms  Reg.  9.79  2.23  0.70  0.00  99.98 
Norco Ranch  Reg.  4.20  1.49  0.38  2.51  98.04 
CA Ranch Fresh  Reg.  4.89  1.48  0.39  0.00  98.87 
Country Creek  Reg.  5.42  1.70  0.34  0.57  96.86 
Petaluma Farms  Reg.  6.03  1.71  0.37  0.00  100.00 
Cal Eggs  Reg.  0.96  1.59  0.36  0.00  100.00 
Nulaid Reg.  2.33  2.14  0.77  0.00  99.21 
Yucaipa Valley  Reg.  1.95  2.20  0.63  0.00  100.00 
Ross Swiss  Reg.  0.73  1.61  0.47  0.00  100.00 
Olivera Reg.  0.72  2.93  0.94  0.00  99.90 
All Other Brands  Reg.  2.15  1.75  0.26  0.00  86.48 
a Attribute indicates whether the summary statistics are for regular (Reg.) or cage-free (CF) eggs. 
 
have the lowest standard deviations (among both cage-free and regular). In fact, we find the 
correlation between average price and standard deviation to be 0.960, an observation consistent 
with eggs sold at the retail level following either a HILO or everyday low price (EDLP) 
strategy. Finally, cage-free eggs are purchased about 5% of the time, consistent with findings 
reported by Sumner, Rosen-Molina, and Matthews (2008) and Smith (2010). 
  Because few consumers were aware of animal welfare issues prior to the public debate sur-
rounding the campaign for Proposition 2, it is likely that demand for cage-free eggs changed 
during the sample period as a result of advertising on either side (Lusk, 2010). Accordingly, 
our data set incorporates a measure of the number of “yes” and “no” television ads to which 
each household was likely exposed over the sample period. This information was obtained 
from TNS Media Intelligence, New York, and is exhaustive of all Proposition 2-related 
television advertisements aired during the 2007–2008 time period. 
 
Empirical Results and Discussion 
Household Demand 
The additional complexity of the random coefficient logit (RCL) model is warranted only if it 
provides a better fit to the data than a simpler alternative. In a discrete choice framework, that 
alternative is a simple multinomial logit (MNL) model. Table 3 presents the results of the 
RCL model and, for comparison purposes, the MNL. As a first step, we assess the validity of Allender and Richards  Animal Welfare Regulation in the California Poultry Industry   433 
 
Table 3. Multinomial and Random Coefficient Logit Demand Estimates: California Eggs 
  MNL Parameters  RCL Parameters  RCL () Std. Dev. 
Variable Estimate  t-Ratio Estimate    t-Ratio     Estimate
 a  t-Ratio 
Binary Cage-Free (cfbt) 0.8644*  8.14  −4.7113*
b −7.91 2.1336*
 c 10.70 
(neg.) Price (−pbt) 0.4576*  17.32  −0.9139*
b  −14.93 1.1311*
 c 24.10 
Organic (orgbt) 3.7747*  19.89  1.0702*
b 11.82  0.4403*
 c 5.34 
Lagged Dependent (ψ1) 1.9220*  76.70  1.1318*  38.93  0.4945*  15.30 
Lagged Dependent (ψ2) 1.8634*  73.79  0.9386*  34.03  0.1223*  4.01 
Discount Dummy (ddbt)  −0.8827*  −3.24  −0.8617*  −3.68    
Disc. Dummy
 
 Price (ddbt pbt)   0.3500* 3.53 0.3769*  4.31     
Binary White Egg (webt) 1.9783*  15.95  1.6899*  19.82     
Cage-Free
 Ad (cfbt adbt)  0.0197* 2.24 0.0263*  2.55     
Variable (γ0i) Intercept Parameters     (i) 
Private Label  1.0532*  4.32  2.1671*  10.23  0.9671*  22.53 
Becky Farms  −0.0252  −0.09  −1.1423*  −4.65 1.5036*  24.31 
Norco Ranch  −1.9645*  −5.42  −4.1784*  −9.97 1.9948*  15.77 
CA Ranch Fresh  −1.0536*  −3.27  −5.7008*  −11.30 3.8778*  18.48 
Country Creek  0.4087  1.49  0.4648*  2.10  1.3311*  22.82 
Petaluma Farms  0.1200  0.42  −1.9355*  −5.81 2.4347*  24.50 
Eggland’s Best  −0.9045*  −2.68  −1.2250*  −4.05 1.4052*  15.58 
Cal Eggs  −1.9069*  −4.06  −5.9292*  −8.95 3.7302*  12.63 
Nulaid  −0.0213  −0.07  −1.4724*  −4.84 1.7682*  21.81 
Yucaipa Valley  −1.4431*  −3.80  −6.5598*  −9.92 3.1877*  16.47 
Ross Swiss  −1.1238*  −2.58  −2.9904*  −4.53 3.3511*  10.41 
Olivera  −3.5625*  −4.97  −8.3143*  −5.87 2.6679*  14.30 
Willamette Egg Farms  0.4180  1.04  −6.1594*  −7.14 7.2373*  11.29 
Variable  (i) Household Income Parameters    
Private Label  0.0322*  2.92  0.0269*  2.91     
Becky Farms  0.0409*  3.31  0.0641*  6.20     
Norco Ranch  0.0822*  5.29  0.1081*  7.05     
CA Ranch Fresh  0.0523*  3.70  0.0486*  3.23     
Country Creek  0.0039  0.31  −0.0168*  −1.74    
Petaluma Farms  0.0159  1.24  0.0324*  2.33     
Eggland’s Best  0.0499*  3.41  0.0407*  3.15     
Cal Eggs  0.0495*  2.43  0.0275  1.11     
Nulaid 0.0074  0.51  0.0093  0.71     
Yucaipa Valley  0.0574*  3.48  0.1302*  6.15     
Ross Swiss  −0.0013  −0.07  −0.1061*  −2.91    
Olivera 0.1305*  4.48  0.2156*  4.16     
Willamette Egg Farms  −0.0587*  −2.93  −0.3182*  −6.88    
Log Likelihood 
Likelihood Ratio 








Note: An asterisk (*) denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. 
a Heterogeneity was modeled using a normal distribution unless otherwise noted. 
b This is the mean of the ln(coefficient). 
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Private Label  −0.4362 0.5914 0.8245 0.5221 0.7788 0.6053 0.5794 
Becky Farms  0.0610  −1.0235 0.1563 0.0883 0.1264 0.0920 0.0791 
Norco Ranch  0.0250  0.0452  −1.2919 0.0611 0.0803 0.0587 0.0365 
CA Ranch Fresh  0.0139  0.0231  0.0564  −0.7763 0.0377 0.0287 0.0192 
Country  Creek  0.0544 0.0876 0.1807 0.0939  −1.1931 0.1005 0.0789 
Petaluma  Farms  0.0369 0.0567 0.1154 0.0634 0.0888  −0.9390 0.0498 
Eggland’s  Best  0.0296 0.0389 0.0549 0.0336 0.0549 0.0391  −1.1584 
Cal  Eggs  0.0087 0.0146 0.0340 0.0178 0.0237 0.0178 0.0125 
Nulaid  0.0201 0.0317 0.0566 0.0306 0.0449 0.0325 0.0287 
Yucaipa  Valley  0.0133 0.0195 0.0350 0.0210 0.0299 0.0214 0.0191 
Ross  Swiss  0.0067 0.0124 0.0315 0.0181 0.0197 0.0144 0.0116 
Olivera  0.0087 0.0119 0.0173 0.0111 0.0164 0.0121 0.0126 
Willamette  Egg  Farms  0.0042 0.0058 0.0091 0.0070 0.0074 0.0064 0.0060 
All  Other  Brands  0.0270 0.0472 0.1013 0.0484 0.0820 0.0531 0.0475 
( extended . . . → )  
the RCL model against the simple logit specification. Because an MNL model is a special case 
of the more general RCL, we use a likelihood-ratio (LR) test. The LR statistic for the null 
hypothesis that the parameter vector from the RCL is equal to that of the MNL is 3,296.62, 
which is chi-square distributed with 53 degrees of freedom. We easily reject the MNL model 
at the 5% level and conclude the RCL provides a better fit to the data. This conclusion is 
further supported by tests of the significance of the coefficients that govern the distributions 
of the random parameters, σ. If there is no heterogeneity among California egg consumers, 
the coefficients σ will equal zero for all i, k, j, and the RCL will collapse into the simple MNL 
logit—a hypothesis that is easily rejected by the RCL model results presented in table 3. 
  We allow for curvature in the demand model that is driven by the interaction between the 
demographic attributes of each household and the unobservable components of demand by 
introducing random coefficients. Flexibility in substitution patterns is evident from the matrix 
of demand elasticities shown in table 4. While the own-price elasticities are less than zero, as 
expected, there is considerable variation in the cross-price elasticities for most brands. Such 
variation in cross-price elasticities does not exist in a simple logit specification due to the IIA 
property, but is generally thought to be present in the data. Therefore, we conclude that the 
RCL model fits that data better than the simple multinomial logit. 
  In the demand model, there are several parameters of inherent interest, from both a mana-
gerial and a theoretical perspective. First, the point estimates for the lognormal distributions 
in table 3 imply the binary cage-free parameter (cfbt) has a mean of 0.0876 and a standard 
deviation of 0.849, which suggests California households do prefer eggs containing animal 
welfare attributes (cfbt > 0). However, there is significant variation in the degree of preference 
across households. Similarly, the mean of the price coefficient estimate is −0.760 with a stand- 
ard deviation of 1.224, which suggests the marginal utility of income is negative as expected. 
  Second, we find the coefficient on discount effect (ddbt) is negative and statistically 
different from 0 at the 5% significance level. Furthermore, the discount-price interaction term 
(ddbt pbt) is positive, which suggests that discounting a brand will shift the demand curve 
out and rotate it counterclockwise. While this may not be the intended result from the retailer’sAllender and Richards  Animal Welfare Regulation in the California Poultry Industry   435 
 















Private  Label  0.6393 0.6717 0.5526 0.7027 0.5218 0.4586 0.9010 
Becky  Farms  0.1045 0.1056 0.0818 0.1292 0.0748 0.0692 0.1534 
Norco  Ranch  0.0678 0.0569 0.0436 0.0932 0.0341 0.0347 0.0999 
CA  Ranch  Fresh  0.0345 0.0283 0.0234 0.0486 0.0198 0.0217 0.0443 
Country  Creek  0.1120 0.1041 0.0852 0.1330 0.0693 0.0561 0.1813 
Petaluma  Farms  0.0749 0.0674 0.0544 0.0890 0.0468 0.0446 0.1059 
Eggland’s  Best  0.0434 0.0476 0.0388 0.0566 0.0407 0.0373 0.0752 
Cal Eggs  −1.0205 0.0173 0.0150 0.0272 0.0137 0.0154 0.0303 
Nulaid 0.0363  −1.2072 0.0286 0.0463 0.0290 0.0282 0.0582 
Yucaipa Valley  0.0256  0.0236  −1.0440 0.0338 0.0213 0.0229 0.0391 
Ross Swiss  0.0182  0.0153  0.0131  −1.2263 0.0118 0.0143 0.0295 
Olivera  0.0146 0.0153 0.0131 0.0192  −1.2283 0.0194 0.0215 
Willamette  Egg  Farms  0.0080 0.0073 0.0078 0.0118 0.0102  −1.0876 0.0092 
All  Other  Brands  0.0644 0.0583 0.0507 0.0915 0.0418 0.0329  −1.5489 
 
perspective, it is consistent with the literature that argues for enhanced price competition due 
to price promotion (Hosken and Reiffen, 2001; MacDonald, 2000). Collectively, these results 
indicate that eggs are only moderately conducive to price promotions, which is true of any 
perishable, staple item. 
  Third, the results in table 3 show the binary white egg variable is positive and statistically 
significant. Fourth, consistent with other empirical studies, the parameters on the lagged 
dependent variables (ψ1 and ψ2) that measure structural state dependence are both positive 
and statistically significant (Seetharaman, 2004; Richards, Patterson, and Tegene, 2007; 
Thunström, 2008). Therefore, we infer that brand inertia exists for both the last and second-
to-last purchase occasions. Furthermore, ψ1 > ψ2 suggests brand inertia has a possible 
decaying effect over time. In addition, the estimates for the lagged dependent variables in 
table 3 imply that brand inertia is one of the most important predictors of brand choice, in 
agreement with findings reported by Seetharaman (2004). Fifth, we find the parameter 
estimate on the interaction term of cage-free and television advertising (cfbt adbt) is positive 
and statistically significant as expected. Consistent with Lusk (2010), we conclude the 2008 
campaign for Proposition 2 had a positive effect on California households’ preference for the 
cage-free attribute. Finally, we find that as household income increases, the probability of 
purchasing almost all of the brands increases (i.e., i > 0). This finding suggests that eggs are 
a normal, as opposed to an inferior, good. 
 
Willingness to Pay 
In order to determine which households will be most affected by regulating cage-free egg 
production, we use household-specific parameter estimates calculated from equation (1) to 
estimate the WTP for cage-free eggs for each household. Because prices will rise by approxi-
mately 20% as a result of higher production costs (Sumner, Rosen-Molina, and Matthews, 
2008), consumers who are not willing to pay the premium will be excluded from the market 
and thus adversely affected by the cage-free egg mandate. We are able to separate each 436   December 2010  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
 
 
household’s brand preference and cage-free attribute preference following Train (2003, 
p. 262). Consequently, all of the WTP calculations below represent estimates of the cage-free 
attribute independent of the brand. We begin our analysis by investigating the WTP estimates 
for California households in general. 
  Using the household-specific WTP estimates, we determine the proportion of households 
in the sample that are willing to pay for a dozen cage-free eggs at the average 2007–2008 
market prices. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the WTP estimates across our sample of 
California households. The estimates indicate 79.37% of the households in the sample would 
not buy cage-free eggs, while 20.63% would.
5 The household-specific parameter estimates 
are then used to estimate the mean WTP, conditional on a household’s willingness to buy 
cage-free eggs. Among this group, we estimate the mean WTP for the cage-free attribute is 
$0.524/dozen with a standard deviation of 0.796. These estimates seem reasonable given the 
low market share of cage-free eggs and that the average 2007–2008 price for regular eggs was 
$1.963/dozen and for cage-free eggs was $3.481/dozen. Because the observed premium of 
$1.518 likely includes the value of other attributes correlated with cage-free, our econometric 
estimate of the average WTP is intuitively plausible, as it reflects the revealed pricing 
behavior of egg marketers. 
  Knowing that some portion of California households would not be willing to buy cage-free 
eggs, we then aggregate the WTP estimates by demographic segments. Here, we focus on 
those households willing to pay the cage-free egg premium a majority of the time.
6 Specif-
ically, we select only those households whose WTP is greater than the average difference 
between regular and cage-free eggs minus two times the standard deviation of the difference 
(i.e., $1.024). This process yielded 79 households in total, representing 7.956% of the total 
number of households; this is consistent with the average market share of cage-free eggs. The 
mean of the WTP across demographic groups is calculated using a simple mean, which is 
appropriate for observational data. We calculate the mean WTP for household income (HH 
Income), and the size of the household measured by the number of members in the household 
(HH Size). Identifying patterns in the mean WTP will allow us to determine the demographic 
distribution of the consumers most impacted by cage-free regulation, i.e., those most likely to 
be unwilling to purchase eggs at the new, higher market prices. 
  Of all the household attributes, income is the most relevant for policy purposes. Figure 2 
shows the mean WTP for different income ranges and suggests there is a great deal of 
variation. Not surprisingly, we find that households with annual incomes of less than $10,000 
are not included in the figure because none of them were willing to pay $1.024 for the cage-
free attribute. An ANOVA is used to test the sample means over the different income ranges. 
The ANOVA produces a test statistic of 0.41, which is less than the critical value at the 5% 
level of significance (1.79). Based on these results, the mean WTPs over the different income 
ranges are not statistically different from one another—likely a result of the large number of 
demographic groups (15) and the small number of households (79). Nevertheless, the results 
are consistent with Andersen (2008) and imply that California households are generally 
willing to pay more for the cage-free attribute as income increases. Consequently, the house-
holds most likely to leave the market if cage-free eggs become the only option are those with 
lower incomes.   
                                                 
5 Somewhat paradoxically, a majority of California voters elected to regulate cage-free egg production, even though almost 
three-quarters of egg consumers are not willing to pay the price difference required. 
6 Throughout 2007 and 2008, the average difference between regular eggs and those containing the cage-free attribute was 
$1.765, with a standard deviation of 0.370, and a minimum and maximum of 0.425 and 3.420. Allender and Richards  Animal Welfare Regulation in the California Poultry Industry   437 
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  Figure 1. Distribution of premium paid for cage-free eggs over conventional 
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    Figure 2. Mean WTP of households currently willing to purchase cage-free 
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Figure 3. Mean WTP for cage-free eggs, aggregated by household size 
 
  Next, we investigate the impact on households of different sizes. Figure 3 shows the mean 
WTP based on the number of members in the household. Within the full sample of house-
holds, there are household sizes with as many as eight individuals, but none of the households 
with five or more were willing to pay the price the market demanded for the cage-free attri-
bute. Thus, these households are not included in the analysis below. Clearly, as the number of 
people in the household increases, the average WTP for the cage-free attribute decreases. We 
test the hypothesis that the mean WTP is equal across all household sizes using an ANOVA 
test. The hypothesis is not rejected at the 5% level of significance given a test statistic of 0.82. 
Therefore, we conclude that none of the means are statistically different from one another. 
Nevertheless, the inverse relationship between household size and average WTP shown in 
figure 3 is expected because the household’s variable cost of consuming eggs will increase 
proportionally to the number of members. Based on this analysis, we conclude that smaller 
household sizes (generally in the range of 1–4 members) are willing to pay more for the cage- 
free attribute, so larger households are more likely to be adversely affected by requiring all 
eggs be cage-free. 
  We also determine the net change in welfare for all California egg consumers to provide a 
more general illustration of the impact of mandating cage-free eggs. Because welfare effects 
are critically dependent upon assumptions regarding the elasticity of demand, we calculate the 
implied change in consumer welfare under a range of demand elasticity and likely price-
change scenarios. Note also that consumers who are currently willing to pay existing cage-
free premiums will not be affected by the Proposition 2 restrictions. Assuming the supply 
curve for cage-free eggs is horizontal at existing prices, only those consumers who are forced 
to pay higher prices for their eggs and those who are shut out of the market will experience a 
welfare loss. The former group of consumers earned positive surplus by purchasing conven-
tional eggs at pre-regulation market prices, but would be willing to pay the premium for theAllender and Richards  Animal Welfare Regulation in the California Poultry Industry   439 
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  Figure 4. Percentage of California households willing to buy the 
 cage-free  attribute 
 
cage-free attribute. The latter were egg consumers, but no longer will be if they only have 
access to higher-priced cage-free eggs. Defining the change in welfare as the compensating 
variation between pre- and post-regulation purchases, we find that the implied welfare loss is 
approximately $106 million, assuming wholesalers pass 100% of their input price increases 
on to consumers (Sumner, Rosen-Molina, and Matthews, 2008). 
  Our assumption that prices will rise by the increase in the cost of production clearly 
assumes perfectly inelastic demand. If the demand elasticity were −1.0, then suppliers and 
consumers would share the rise in production costs. Assuming a unit elasticity of demand, if 
retail prices increase by 5%, then the implied welfare loss is $28 million; likewise, if prices 
rise by 10%, the implied loss is $55 million. However, if regular egg prices increase to the 
average 2007–2008 cage-free retail prices (i.e., an increase of 87.5%), then the implied welfare 
loss would be $293 million. Our baseline assumptions therefore imply a loss in consumer 
welfare that lies on the conservative side of the likely welfare loss, as it lies below the mean 
of the possible extreme outcomes. In more intuitive terms, our welfare simulations reveal that 
California egg consumers would need about $106 million in compensation after the initiative 
goes into effect in 2015 to be as well off as they are now. 
  Our findings show that California cage-free egg consumers consist of households with 
fewer individuals and higher incomes. The California households likely most affected by the 
recent initiative are those with five or more members and/or those with yearly incomes less 
than $30,000. Furthermore, the overall average WTP calculated for almost every demographic 
attribute was below the price differential required to buy an egg brand at market prices. This 
suggests that regardless of income or household size, the average consumer likely would not 
be willing to buy cage-free eggs at the 2007–2008 market price. Referring back to figure 1, 
the 20.63% of households willing to buy cage-free eggs appear to be a niche market. For a 
majority of current egg-consuming California households to be willing to buy a dozen eggs 
with the cage-free attribute, (i.e., will be egg consumers after January 1, 2015), the price 440   December 2010  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
 
 
differential above regular eggs would need to be $0.496 or lower, or approximately $2.513 
per dozen. Figure 4 illustrates this point in general for the price differential of cage-free eggs 
to regular eggs. We see from this graphic that if the passage of the initiative pushes the price 
of eggs up, the number of California households buying eggs will significantly decrease. 
 
Conclusion and Implications 
 
Caged eggs will be banned from sale as of January 1, 2015 (Sumner, Rosen-Molina, and 
Matthews, 2008). Eggs sold in California using cage-free methods will cost approximately 
20% more than regular eggs, so consumers who are not willing to pay the premium for cage-
free eggs will be effectively excluded from the market. This study estimates the number and 
type of households likely to be most impacted by the standards for confining farm animals 
initiative, and estimates the implied welfare losses imposed by higher egg prices. The demand 
for eggs by California consumers is modeled using a random coefficient logit model, which 
allows us to recover household-specific estimates of the WTP for cage-free eggs. 
  We find that at 2007–2008 prices, 79% of California households would not buy cage-free 
eggs. Indeed, many California households will no longer purchase eggs at the new prices. The 
WTP estimates also suggest that cage-free egg consumers are largely still a niche market, 
generally consisting of households with a higher income and/or fewer individual members. 
Aggregate welfare losses are estimated at $106 million, assuming a 20% increase in retail prices 
(Sumner, Rosen-Molina, and Matthews, 2008). Finally, we find that as the per dozen price of 
cage-free eggs increases, households will drop out of the market at an exponential rate in the 
price range of about $1.80 to $3.79. Taken together, these results appear to confirm that the 
higher prices required for cage-free eggs will impose high and regressive costs on California 
egg consumers. 
  The implications of our findings are many. First, under California legislation signed into 
law in July 2010 (AB 1437), we assume conventional egg imports will not be allowed. How-
ever, without this restriction, egg imports into California would have increased substantially. 
In this scenario, quality would suffer, particularly in the summer months, as the lag between 
production and sale increases. Second, under the current law, California egg production will 
fall dramatically, which has somewhat obvious and adverse implications for the state 
economy. Third, consumer groups are likely to call for labeling requirements as an alternative 
to regulating cage-free eggs. If consumers are aware of the credence attribute embodied in 
the eggs they are purchasing, they will be able to decide whether to support cage-free egg 
practices or not. 
  Other animal welfare initiatives are likely to have similar welfare impacts. For example, 
Proposition 204 in Arizona, which requires the stall-free production of pork, is expected to 
drive pork production out of the state. While imports are allowed in this case, pork prices will 
surely rise as a result of the increased transportation costs and inefficient production practices 
for any producers who remain. Beyond animal welfare, many other production practices 
impose negative externalities on the environment; these exist now as credence goods in the 
products people buy. Regulating these credence attributes will raise prices, reduce choice, and 
impose welfare losses on consumers as a cost of achieving social goals. 
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